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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-'J-
RORERT STEVEN SMITH 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 19053 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, ROBERT STEVEN SMITH, appeals from a judgment 
and conviction of Attempted Robbery, a Third Degree Felony, and 
Attempted Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, in the Third Judicial 
J1str1ct Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
"he Honorable David B. Dee presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted by a jury of Attempted Robbery, 
" Degree Felony, and Attempted Burglary, a Third Degree 
in violation of §76-6-301, §76-6-202, and §76-4-101, 
'•.t11 Code Ann. (1978). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the conviction and judgrnenL 
against him reversed and the charges dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 15, 1981, Robert Steven Smith was arrested 
by personnel in the South Salt Lake City Police Department 
(Trial transcript for 1/14/83 at 193, 1/18/83 at 26). On 
that date, statements were given to the South Salt Lake City 
Police by Brian Scott Moss and Gilbert Anthony Sisneros which 
implicated Appellant in an alleged burglary and robbery 
scheme in the household of Myra E. Kuhre. (Findings, 
and Order on Motion to Dismiss on the Grounds of Pre-Accusation 
Delay, Dated January 11, 1983, at 2 (hereinafter cited as 
Findings)). Those allegations formed the basis for the 
charges contained in a four count Information that was filed 
against the appellant on September 7, 1982 (Findings at 5), 
which case was then tried below in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, beginning January 13, 1983. 
From October 15, 1981, to the present date, Appellam 
has been in the custody of the Utah State Prison (Findings at 
4). On the above date, prior to his arrest, Appellant was a 
resident in a half-way house on a work release status. Id. 
Due to the arrest by the South Salt Lake City Police resulti"P 
from the accusations by the above-named witnesses, Appellant', 
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half "'ay house status was revoked and he was returned to the 
Utah State Prison (Findings at 4). He remained in prison 
pending the filing of the charges and the trial of this case. 
Id, A January 12, 1982, parole date that had been set for 
Appellant was rescinded by the Board of Pardons due to the 
suspected criminal activity that is the subject of this 
case (Findings at 4, 5). 
Evidence of Appellant's involvement in the crimes 
charged in this case was first obtained by law enforcement 
authorities on October 15, 1983. (Findings at 2). That 
evidence consisted of post-Miranda statements given by Brian 
Scott Moss and Gilbert Anthony Sisneros. In brief summary, 
those statements indicated that Moss and Sisneros had been 
picked up by Appellant on October 15, 1981, that materials 
for a burglary were in the car, and that a plan was made to 
burglarize the home of Myre E. Kuhre. 
At trial, the only evidence adduced that went to 
the guilt of Robert Steven Smith was the above testimony 
from Brian Scott Moss and Gilbert Anthony Sisneros (see 
tcariscript of trial in general). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNNECESSARY DELAY BY THE STATE OF 
APPROXIMATELY ELEVEN MONTHS BETWEEN 
APPELLANT'S ARREST AND THE DATE 
FORMAL CHARGES WERE FILED AGAINST 
HIM VIOLATED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
A. THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL IS A FUNDAMENTAL 
GUARANTEE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND SERVES 
TO PROTECT ACCUSED PEOPLE FROM MISCARRIAGES 
OF JUSTICE. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial •. The Magna 
Carta set forth the right in 1215, stating, "We will sell to 
no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice 
or right." Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 
(1967) citing to Magna Carta, C 29 [c 40 of King John's 
Charter of 1215] (1225) in footnote 8. Sir Edward Coke noted 
delay of a trial would improperly deny justice and would be 
contrary to the law and custom of England. Klopfer at 224. 
The Supreme Court in Klopfer noted our founding fathers 
considered the right fundamental. Id. at 225. 
The Sixth Amendment Right to Speedy Trial has multipi. 
purposes. People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 355, 130 N.E. 2d Bql 
893 (1955), sets forth three purposes of the guarantee. 
First, it protects the accused against prolonged imprisonment. 
Second, it relieves the accused of anxiety and public susri 1· 1c 
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Tl<i, rl, it protects him from hazards of standing trial so far 
ternoverl in time that means of proving his innocence are no 
longer available. The third enumerated reason is particularly 
important for the accused who is imprisoned because he is at 
lease able to assist in preparation of his defense. See 
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966). This Court 
noted the purpose of the Sixth Amendment to prevent undue 
and oppressive pretrial detention, minimize the anxiety 
and concern of unresolved accusations and prevent the 
miscarriage of justice caused by the impaired ability of the 
defendant to prepare a defense in State v. Lozano, 23 Utah 
2d 312, 314, 426 P.2d 710 (1969). 
In the leading case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 
519-20 (1972), the Supreme Court established the societal 
interest in preservation of the right. The Court noted speedy 
trials would reduce the likelihood of crimes being committed 
by those free on pretrial release programs. The Court also 
noted accused people might be more inclined to manipulate pleas 
because of overcrowded court calendars, thereby weakening the 
•c1 iminal justice system. Also, delays in coming to trial 
1 •c:rease the chances of success in the rehabilitation process 
- > tPn<l i n'J the length of time before an accused can be 
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admitted into such a program. Finally, the Court noted the 
financial and administrative costs incurred by lengthy 
pretrial detention. 
B. THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ATTACHED 
OCTOBER 15, 1981, WHEN APPELLANT WAS 
ARRESTED. 
The Supreme Court, in Dillingham v. United States, 
432 U.S. 64 (1975), addressed the question of when the right 
to a Speedy Trial attached. That decision held that a 22-month 
delay between the petitioner's arrest and indictment 
unconstitutional deprivation of his Sixth Amendment speedy 
trial rights. In so holding, the Court further concluded that 
"it is readily understandable that it is either a formal indict· 
ment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by 
arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the 
particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the 
Sixth Amendment." Id. at 65 (emphasis added). Quoting from 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), the Court reasone:, 
"On its face, the protection of the [Sixth] Amendment is 
activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and 
only to those persons who have been 'accused' in the course of 
that prosecution." Id. at 64-65. The court continued: 
"Invocation of the speedy trial provision thus need not await 
indictment, information, or other formal charge." Applying 
Dillingham to the present case, Mr. Smith's Sixth Amendment 
attached on the date of his arrest, not the date he was formal! 
charged. 
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In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), 
rourt had earlier addressed the question of whether a 
three year delay in the pre-indictment period constituted 
either an unconstitutional denial of due process or an 
unconstitutional denial of the Sixth Amendment right to 
speedy trial. In holding the delay was not unconstitutional, 
the Court found the Sixth Amendment right did not attach 
until the indictment was handed down. Factually Marion 
differs from the case at bar because in Marion the arrests did 
not occur until after the indictment. In the present case, 
Mr. Smith was arrested October 15, 1981, and not charged until 
September 7, 19 8 2. There fore, he stood "accused" on October 15, 
1981, and was protected by speedy trial provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment. Marion at 325. See also United States v. Lovasco, 
431 U.S. 783 (1977), where the Court held no violation of speedy 
trial rights due to a pre-indictment delay of 18 months since 
the occurrance of the offense. Again, no arrest took place 
until after the indictment, distinguishing Lovasco from the 
State v. Almeida, 509 P.2d 549, 551 (Hawaii 1973), 
i •o iJ0s further support for the time of arrest as triggering 
, • <>t<'ctions of the Sixth Amendment. In Almeida, the 
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court explained that either formal indictment or information 01 
restraint of liberty imposed by arrest, whichever occurred 
first, would commence the protection of the Sixth Amendment. 
C. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL 
IS NOT SUPPLANTED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
Although both Dillingham and Marion make it clear 
that the speedy trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment attach 
upon the arrest of the accused, the argument might be made that 
a state's statute of limitations provisions are the exclusive 
remedy available to Appellant. It is admitted that the 
Information in the case at bar was filed within the applicable 
statute of limitations period. See §76-1-302, Utah Code 
Ann. ( 19 7 8 ) . 
Reliance upon the §76-1-302 Utah Code Ann., however, 
would be misplaced in this case. The Marion Court asserts that 
although the speedy trial right attaches upon the arrest of 
the defendant, it does not apply to the period of time between 
the crime and the arrest or charge. Id. at 322. The applicable 
statute of limitations protests us all during that period. 
Upon arrest or charge, however, the additional speedy trial 
protection attaches so as to "present undue and oppressive 
incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern 
accompanying public accusations and to limit the possibilitieo 
-8-
u-,,,t long delay will impair the ability of the accused to defend 
himself." United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966). 
Although the statute of limitations serves the same purpose 
its protections as an exclusive remedy apply only to the 
l 
pre-arrest time period. It, therefore, is not the exclusive 
remedy available to the Appellant in the case at bar. 
D. THIS COURT SHOULD ANALYZE APPELLANT'S 
CASE IN THE LIGHT OF BARKER V. WINGO. 
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-20, 530-33 
(1972), the Supreme Court set forth a comprehensive four factor 
balancing test in assessing claims of denial of speedy trial 
later adopted by this Court in State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538 
(Utah 1979). In Barker, the Court held continuances over a 
five and one-half year period were not a denial of the 
defendant's right to speedy trial. Although none of the factors 
is to be determinative, each is to be balanced against the 
others in deciding whether the delay becomes unconstitutional. 
The four factors enumerated are: (1) the length of the delay; 
12) the reasons for the delay, including good faith prosecutorial 
efforts; ()) whether and when the defendant asserted the right; 
l, ,,,t course, if actual prejudice is asserted, the Due Process 
1 Jl'I would be an additional remedy available to the defendant. 
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and (4) whether the defendant suffered any prejudice. 
United States v. Lovasco stated the test must embrace the 
notions of "whether the action complained of ••. violates 
those 'fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the 
base of our civil and political institutions, and 
which define 'the community's sense of fair play and decency.'" 
431 U.S. at 790. 
In applying the four Barker factors to the case 
at bar, Petitioner contends the scales tip in his favor. 
First, the delay was almost eleven months; from October 15, 
1981, the date he was arrested to September 7, 1982, the date 
he was formally charged. The State's only valid articulated 
reason for a delay was because of an "ongoing investigation" 
until March or April 1982. However, no new evidence was 
discovered during the five or six month "investigation." 
In Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1965), 
the court held due process under the Fifth Amendment had 
been denied when formal charges were delayed for an 
oppressive and unjustifiable time after the offense .. 
The case involved a narcotics transaction in which the 
government wished to continue using the agent in ongoing 
investigation in other drug sales before disclosing his 
identity. Specifically the court noted no new evidence 
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""s during the delay and the agent had, in fact 
'1,1pJ icated some of his earlier discoveries. Id. at 212. 
Thee court frowned on the fact that the delay so hindered the 
memory of the narcotics agent, he was only able to testify 
from a recollection refreshed just before trial by referring 
to entries in a notebook. 
In the present case, the State's chief witness, 
Mr. Moss, was unable to consistently remember his version 
of the events during the four times he testified. He testified 
about the events on October 15, 1981, January 11, 1982, during 
a preliminary hearing and again at trial. Some of his 
inconsistencies as well as those of the other State witness, 
Mr. Sisneros, are set forth below: 
"Question. And as a matter of fact, calling 
your attention to the sworn deposition of January 11th, 
1982, isn't it a fact that in that statement you had previously 
stated that when Mr. Smith drove by to pick you up at 21st 
and 3rd East that Mr. Pearson was with him at that time, 
right? 
"Answer. Yes. 
"Question. And today you stated that, no, Mr. 
·"'"1' "as not with him but Mr. Smith was alone; is that 
,,,.,-t 
"Answer. Yes. 
-11-
"Question. Okay. Also, in the same deposition 
here (indicating) of January 11th, you stated that there 
was no conversation between the time of being picked up 
at 21st South and 3rd East and the time that you drove to 
21st South and 5th East regarding any plans; is that 
correct? 
"Answer. Yes. 
"Question. So there were no conversations. 
But today you come in and you now say that there was extensive 
conversations about the illegality about the plan and what 
was to be done, et cetera; right? 
"Answer. Yeah. 
"Question. All right. Do you have 
did you have on you when you left from school 
what else 
when you left 
to go to school that morning? What else did you have with 
you? 
"Answer. Just the hat and the stocking and my 
gloves." 
Do you recall his testimony that he had a black 
pair of leather gloves at the time? 
"Question. Okay, now talking about these orange 
gloves here, Exhibit No. 6, when •lid you say you first saw 
those gloves? 
"Answer. When Mr. Pearson got them out of his car. 
"Question. Allright. And how many pairs did he 
bring back? 
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"Answer. When I talked--he had two. There was 
those ones. And like I was talking to Mr. Housley, he had 
a brown pair of leather ones." 
This is after he had told Mr. Housley that he 
only brought one pair of gloves, the orange pair of gloves. 
Now, on cross-examination in an attempt to ferret 
out the truth now we have two sets of gloves. And you recall 
Detective Judd's testimony regarding the search on Moss at 
the time, at the South Salt Lake Police Station. "How many 
gloves, if any, did you find on the people?" Mr. Judd said 
he found no gloves. He didn't find a brown leather pair or 
black leather pair. 
(T. 47-48, January 19, 1983, Closing Argument). 
The varied testimony of both Mr. Moss and Mr. Sisneros 
shows that their memory was hindered by the delay. Unlike 
the narcotics agent in Ross, they were unable to refresh their 
recollection from notebooks. Such faulty memory is another 
reason to disallow unwarranted delays in charging Appellant. 
tice cannot be met when time-warped testimony reflects such 
inaccuracies. 
The delay in the present case, just as the court found 
k '1 1 ln Ross, was not necessary for effective law enforce-
i1en t- _ lie re, the State did not assert there were undercover 
) T\ \ whose identity could not be revealed at the time, no 
1-··U1cr ,!,,fendC1nts were added after the investigation in the case, 
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nor was any new evidence or witness discovered during the 
delay. The only evidence the State ever procured against 
Appellant was obtained at the time of his arrest. Thus, 
the State has not adequately justified the delay from 
October, 1981, to March, 1982. 
Finally, while the prosecutor's August, 1982, vacatioc 
may, arguendo, explain the one month delay from August, 1982, 
to September, 1982, it does not account for the delay from 
April, 1982, to August, 1982. The bare assertion by the 
State that the delay in filing the information was due to an 
ongoing investigation must be viewed as no justification at all 
for a delay which amounted to eleven months. 
The third factor listed in Barker has been called 
the Demand Doctrine. At one time, defendants were held to have 
waived their right to speedy trial by failure to demand it. 
Appellant, however, asserted his right in a timely fashion by 
filing a 120 day request for disposition of detainers in the 
latter part of October, 1981,. and again in September, 1982. 
(Finding at 5). The Demand Doctrine, however, has been rejects" 
by the Supreme Court in Barker, which simply considers a derna": 
as one of many factors to be considered in determining whether 
defendant's speedy trial right is violated. In United States 
Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230, 231 (N.D. Ill. 1955), the court statci, 
"The stakes are too high to imply a waiver on his part .. 
require a man to beg for trial on such a charge, with its 
enormous pena 1 ty, requires too much of human nature." In 
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r2·,·l_()r_"· United States, 238 F. 2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the 
,:0 11r r rP jected the doctrine because there was no showing the 
defendant, who was incarcerated in New York, knew of the 
indictment against him. That case carries particular significance 
liere where the Appellant could not know of any indictment or 
charge against him because there was none until September, 1982. 
In People v. Prosser, 130 N.E. 2d 891, 895 (N.Y. 1955), Judge 
Fuld noted it is the state which initiates the action and the 
state that has the duty to see that the defendant is brought 
to trial. In the Supreme Court case of Dillingham v. United 
States, 423 U .s. 64 (1975), where the post-arrest, pre-indictment 
delay was held to deny petitioner his right to speedy trial, the 
petitioner's motions were made post-arraignment and post-trial. 
423 IJ .s. at 64. Since there is no Utah case law directly on point, 
Appellant urges this Court to reject the Demand Doctrine, 
consider it simply to be one factor to weigh, and find that 
the filing of the 120 dispositions was a good-faith effort 
by Appellant to demand a trial in this case. 
The fourth factor of Barker's balancing test require 
assessment of the prejudice to the defendant caused 
'="! the delay. The Barker Court identifies three interests 
'' t-1" accu:;ocl protected by the speedy trial right which, 
-,,IT",,-,_,misecl, would result in prejudice to the accused. 
ar,_,: ( lJ the prevention of oppressive pre-trial 
dLCl'tdtinn; (2) the minimization of anxiety and concern of 
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the accused; and (3) the limitation of the possibility that th" 
defense will be impaired. Barker at 532. See also Klopfer v. 
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 218, 222 (1967). 
Regarding the first of the above interests, Barker 
expresses concern that the obvious societal disadvantages of 
long pre-trial incarceration are even more serious for the 
accused who cannot obtain his release. Barker v. Wingo at 532. 
The detrimental impact of such incarceration is felt by the 
individual through the resulting loss of employment, disruption 
of family life, the enforcement of idleness, and the curtailment 
of rehabilitation. Id. The anxiety and concern of the accused 
caused by the delay between accusation and trial has long 
been recognized as central to the reason for the existance of 
the speedy trial right, United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 
(1966), and virtually mandates the conclusion that a defendant 
is always prejudiced by such delay. Finally Barker asserts that 
"if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to 
gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his 
defense." Barker v. Wingo at 533 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, all of these above interests 
have compromised. The Appellant was in a half-way house prior 
to his October 15, 1981, arrest. In a half-way house, 
rehabilitation proceeds apace, employment is available, and 
as a result idleness is avoided. As a result of his arrest, 
Appellant was returned to the Utah State Prison and thus was 
compelled to take a giant step uackward from the above goals. 
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The anxiety, concern and frustration which would necessarily 
result from eleven months of wondering what the status the 
charges was needs no further description than simply this 
statement. Finally, the impairment of Appellant's defense 
is equally clear on its face. Detailed investigation of who 
the Appellant's accusers were, what their involvement was in 
the matter, as well as investigation of other witnesses is 
critical to a case which is based, at least as it related 
to Appellant, solely on the confession testimony of two 
witnesses regarding conversations which occurred on only one 
or two specific occasions. Prevention of defendant's involve-
ment in such investigation due to his incarceration, exacerbated 
by the passage of time, diluted the ability of the defense to 
reconstruct what actually transpired during the alleged 
conversations. 
Guidance in balancing the above factors is provided 
by the Barker Court's own balancing efforts in that case. 
After concluding that the length of time was too long and 
unjustifiable, the Court further found that that factor was 
'.'l!twcighed by the prejudice being minimal and the fact that the 
C•endant did not want a speedy trial. 
In the present case, the fact that the delay was 
',,,,,,ij"1c1idy shorter than that in Barker, is counterbalanced 
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by the factors that the Appellant demonstrated a desire to ha'.'" 
the case resolved by filing a 120 day disposition, that he was 
incarcerated the entire time and thereby prejudiced and that 
the prosecutor's offered justification is not supported by 
anything tangible and is therefore inadequate. Where an accuses 
is incarcerated, the standard for proceeding quickly with the 
prosecution, unless the defendant himself is the architect 
of the delay, should be strict. The consequences of pre-
trial, and in this case, pre-information incarceration, are 
too onerous to permit deviation from the expeditious 
disposition of the case for any but very substantial reasons. 
The reason articulated by the state of a continuing 
investigation does not outweigh the right of an accused 
who is incarcerated to have his day in court much sooner than 
eleven months. If the accused is not incarcerated, then 
such a reason may be adequate. With the accused in prison, 
however, then more a compelling reason for delay should be 
required -- such as the safety of an undercover investigator. 
No such compelling reason is offered in the present case. 
On balance, society's interest in the enforcement of the law 
is severely tested when the exchange is the continued 
incarceration of an innocent-until-proven-guilty accused. 
The orderly and fair administration of justice, as mandated 
by the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, requires that a 
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t,011yer JUStification than simply the continuing of an 
11 , .. tiga t ion exist before any de lay is permitted in the 
pr0secution of one who is incarcerated. 
POINT II 
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL REQUIRES 
DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM. 
If the Court finds that the Appellant has been 
denied his speedy trial right, then, although severe, 
the only remedy available is the dismissal of the charges. 
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973); Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Amendment protects Appellant from the 
hazards caused by delay of prosecution and trial. Because 
Appellant was arrested on October 15, 1981, his speedy 
Lrial right attached as of that date. The anxiety and 
uncertainly caused by the State's unwarranted delay caused 
to suffer prejudice, and, because the delay 
Letween and the filing of an Information, amounted to 
months, Appellant's speedy trial right has been 
Therefore, Appellant prays that this Court find 
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that said right has been violated and that this Court 
reverses the conviction of the lower court and orders that the 
charges be dismissed. 
DATED this of June, 1984. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TffOMAS <(_:_ cCORMICK 
Attorney or Appellant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah this __{__day of June, 1984. 
!' 
-20-
